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Remarks on the Syntax and Semantics of Mixed Quotation[1]

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Cappelen and Lepore's "Varieties of Quotation" builds on Davidson (1968, 1979) to give an account of mixed quotation. The result is a rich paper, which introduces interesting data and raises many thought-provoking questions. Given this, I can't possibly discuss the paper in its entirety. Instead, I intend simply to paraphrase their position, develop it a little, and then raise a few concerns.

1. Paraphrase and Development

Let me begin with their example. Cappelen and Lepore give to sentence (1a) the neo-Davidsonian logical form in (1b).

(1)
(a) Alice said that life "is difficult to understand"
(b) $\exists u$[says (Alice, u) & samesays(u, that) & same-tokens(u, these)]. Life is difficult to understand

As a first pass: The logical form (1b) is true if and only if Alice said something which has both the same content and (at least in part) the same form as the demonstrated sentence 'Life is difficult to understand'. For Cappelen and Lepore, then, mixed quotation, like indirect quotation, gives the content of the reported utterance; and, like direct quotation, mixed quotation specifies (in part) the form of the reported utterance.

This is their proposal about what mixed quotation speech reports mean in English. But—a point which looms large in the following—the proposal isn't a *semantic theory* of mixed quotation reports . . . at least not yet. To get a semantics for mixed quotation Cappelen and Lepore need (at least) to

specify some kind of *compositional mechanism* which, loosely speaking, takes mixed-quotation sentences as input and gives their meanings as output. (Less loosely speaking, the desired mechanism would take **surface structures** as input and give **logical forms** as output.) I want to begin by reflecting on what such a mechanism might look like. My reasons will emerge in due course.

Cappelen and Lepore aren't unaware of the need to provide a compositional mechanism for mixed quotations. They even provide a hint, in footnote 21, about what it would look like: 'says' in (1a), they maintain, takes as its grammatical object *both* the complement clause (2a) *and* the NP in (2b)—and this is why the sentence functions both as a direct and indirect speech report.

(2)
(a) $[_{CP}$ that $[_S$ life is difficult to understand]]
(b) $[_{NP}$ "life is difficult to understand"]²

Putting aside the important question of how the verb 'says' can take two grammatical objects, this proposal demands an interpretive rule for 'say'—one which covers three possible cases: *nominal* object, *clausal* object, or both. Cappelen and Lepore don't provide an interpretive rule, but here's a simplified attempt. I intend it to be in the spirit of their view—so that, should there be problems with it, the problems will arise for their view as well.

(3) *Cappelen-Lepore Style Interpretive Rule for 'Says'*
(a) If the grammatical object of $\ulcorner\alpha$ says$\urcorner$ is of the form $[_{CP}$ that $[_S \beta]]$ then generate the logical form $\ulcorner\exists u[\text{says}(\alpha, u) \,\&\, \text{samesays}\,(u, \text{that})].\,\beta\urcorner$[13]
(b) If the grammatical object of $\ulcorner\alpha$ says$\urcorner$ is of the form $[_{NP}$ "β"] then generate the logical form $\ulcorner\exists u[\text{says}(\alpha, u) \,\&\,$ same-tokens $(u, \text{these})].\,\beta\urcorner$
(c) If the grammatical object of $\ulcorner\alpha$ says$\urcorner$ is both of the form $[_{CP}$ that $[_S \beta]]$ and of the form $[_{NP}$ "β"] then generate the logical form $\ulcorner\exists u[\text{says}\,(\alpha, u) \,\&\,$ samesays$(u, \text{that}) \,\&\,$ same-tokens$(u, \text{these})].\,\beta\urcorner$[14]

Returning to example (1a), rule (3) works as follows: Because, it's supposed, 'says' takes the clause (2a) as its grammatical object; and 'says' *also* takes the NP in (2b) as its grammatical object, both samesays and same-tokens enter into the logical form. By (3c).[5] (α in this case is 'Alice'; β is 'Life if difficult to understand'.) While 'samesays' deals with the content of the utterance, 'same-tokens' seizes on its form. Next step: 'that' demonstrates

the whole of 'Life is difficult to understand', while 'these' demonstrates only 'is difficult to understand'. In which case, (1a) is predicted true iff Alice uttered something which (a) samesays 'Life is difficult to understand' and (b) same-tokens 'is difficult to understand'.

That, in a nutshell, is Cappelen and Lepore's proposal for the meaning of mixed quotation—fleshed out with a simplified compositional mechanism. I now want to consider some problems with the view. I'll begin with some difficulties it inherits directly from Davidson's paratactic view—in particular, his inclusion of a demonstrative in the logical form of speech reports.

2. Troubles with the "Demonstrative"

This section contains two arguments for the same conclusion: There is no demonstrative in the logical form of speech reports corresponding to the 'that' of 'says that'. If this is right, then there is no demonstrative, corresponding to 'that', in the logical form of *mixed quotation* speech reports. In which case, to put it bluntly, Cappelen and Lepore's proposal cannot work.

A Demonstrative in the Syntactic Structure?

As everybody knows, the English 'that' in speech reports corresponds to 'que' in French; and, of course, the word 'que' is not a demonstrative in French. This fact might suggest the following bad argument against Davidson's paratactic view:

(4)   *The Bad Argument*
       Premise 1: The word 'que' in French belief reports isn't syntac-
              tically a demonstrative.
       Conclusion: Davidson's paratactic view is mistaken about
              French.

The argument in (4) is a glaring non-sequitur. As Lepore and Loewer say (1990: 98), "That a demonstrative does not appear, for example, in French and Italian propositional attitude sentences does not show that the paratactic account is wrong for these languages." One reason the premise doesn't entail the conclusion is this: There could be a demonstrative in the *logical form* of French speech reports, even if there is no demonstrative word in the surface structure.

Armed with this thought, consider the fact that, syntactically speaking, the *English* word 'that' which follows 'said' in (5a) is *not* the same word which precedes 'is a goof' in (5b).

(5)
(a) Alice said that Dole is a goof
(b) That is a goof

The former is a complementizer, not a demonstrative; the latter is a demonstrative, not a complementizer. In fact, these words are not in general pronounced the same: While the complementizer can be phonologically reduced to *th't,* or left out altogether, the demonstrative cannot. Given this, a different bad argument can be mounted—this time about English. And it too can be rebutted with ease.

(6) *The Bad Argument—English Version*
      Premise 1: The word 'that' in English belief reports isn't syntactically a demonstrative.
      Conclusion: Davidson's paratactic view is mistaken about English.
      Rebuttal: Even if there isn't a demonstrative word in the English surface structure, there could be one in the logical form of English belief reports.

I rehearse these bad arguments to distinguish them from my own quarrel with Davidson's paratactic account (and with Cappelen and Lepore). My argument is obviously different from the foregoing because, unlike them, mine is a pretty good argument. Here it is. (α and θ are variables over linguistic expressions.)

(7) *The Pretty Good Argument*
      Premise 1: The 'that' of 'says that' is not a demonstrative word in the surface structure of speech reports.
      Premise 2: If α is not a demonstrative word in the surface structure of θ, then *ceteris paribus* there is no demonstrative corresponding to α in the logical form of θ.
      Conclusion 2: Ceteris paribus there is no demonstrative, corresponding to the 'that' of 'says that', in the logical form of speech reports.

This argument is valid. Is it sound? In particular, is Premise 2 true?[6] I believe so—because it is supported by the following Interface Rule. And, as I'll now suggest, the Interface Rule itself is true—both in general, and in the case at hand.

(8) *Interface Rule: Ceteris paribus,* a hypothesis about logical form which respects syntax is preferable to a hypothesis which does not.

Given (8), the fact that English (and French) speech reports don't (generally) contain demonstrative terms in surface syntax suggests—doesn't entail, but suggests—that there's no demonstrative in their logical form. But why believe (8)? There is, first of all, a very good methodological reason: Downplaying syntax, when doing semantics, is a risky business. As I said above, semantics has two parts: On the one hand, the semanticist attempts to find the meaning of the various forms in the language; on the other hand, she looks for the compositional rules which map these forms onto their meanings. If you are interested in the mapping from structure to meaning, you obviously cannot ignore syntax: that would be to ignore one of the relata in the relation. (A familiar example: One solid motivation for assigning generalized quantifiers to English quantifier phrases, rather than treating them syncategorematically as Russell did, is that quantifier phrases are *syntactic constituents* of English sentences.) Indeed, even if your interest is restricted to finding out what expressions mean, you cannot ignore the combinatorial task—because *which* meaning ought to be assigned to an expression E will sometimes depend, in part, on what the simplest, most plausible, compositional mechanism assigns to E. So, semanticists ignore syntax at their peril.

A second reason for endorsing the Interface Rule: It is useful elsewhere. Consider the following case. Some wacky semanticist could, I suppose, convince himself that the Spanish (9a) has the logical form (9b):

(9)
(a) No sé si voy a ir [*trans.:* "I don't know whether I will go"]
(b) I don't know: Yes, I will go

Our eccentric semanticist might next conjecture that the logical form of the *English* 'I don't know whether I will go' is (9b) as well! This hypothesis is, I take it, quite absurd. How might we set this nutty semanticist straight? We might say: "But look, Spanish 'si' in (a) corresponds *not* to the English 'yes', but rather to the English 'whether'." To which he will undoubtedly reply: "That an affirmation marker does not appear in the corresponding English sentences does not show that my account is wrong." And he'll be right, because there could be an "affirmation marker" in the logical form of English sentences, even though there isn't one in surface structure. Nor need he be swayed by differences in intonation between affirmation-si and complementizer-si: He'll simply point out that, even if there isn't an affirmation word in the Spanish surface structure, there could be one at logical form.

Still, one need not give into the hypothesis that (9b) is the logical form of (9a)—and of its English translation. Here's one reason, among others:

Semantics should, *ceteris paribus,* respect syntax; and the syntax of English strongly suggests that (9b) isn't the logical form of the English sentence 'I don't know whether I will go'; similarly, comparative syntax suggests that 'I don't know: Yes, I will go' isn't the logical form of the Spanish (9a). Of course this response relies on (8), the Interface Rule. But surely the response, though not the only one possible, is among the reasonable rebuttals. And so is the Interface Rule on which it depends.

From here on, I'll assume that the Interface Rule in (8) is a sound principle. But does it apply to the case at hand? In particular, can it license the inference from Davidson's account not respecting syntax to its semantic inadequacy? The following example suggests that it can—and it provides more hints about *why* (8) is sound.

In discussing Davidson's paratactic account of propositional attitudes, Higginbotham (1986: 39) drew attention to sentences like 'Every boy believes that he is a nice fellow', in which a pronoun in the complement clause is bound by a quantifier in the matrix sentence. Mixed quotational sentences can be like this too. Witness (10).

(10) Every student says that she "is cool"

How would Cappelen and Lepore treat this sentence? The rough-and-ready rule I gave in (3) obviously will not work: If we take as α the quantifier phrase 'every student', the predicted logical form is:

(11) $\exists u$[says (every student, u) & samesays(u, that) & same-tokens(u, these)]. She is cool

The logical form (11) gives the existential quantifier widest scope, which (wrongly) predicts that there is a single utterance produced collectively by all the students. Rule (3) can be fixed however, to accommodate quantifier phrases in subject position, without doing violence to Cappelen and Lepore's proposal. Here's the result:

(12) *Quantifier-Friendly Interpretive Rule for 'Says':*
       If the grammatical object of 'says' is both of the form
       $[_{CP}$ that $[_S \beta]]$ and of the form $[_{NP}$ "β"] then generate
       $\ulcorner \lambda x. \{\exists u$[says ($x$, u) & samesays(u, that) & same-tokens(u, these)]\}. $\beta \urcorner$ and combine this with the grammatical subject α of 'says'.

The grammatical subject α can, of course, combine with the resulting logical form in two ways: Roughly speaking, where α is a singular term it becomes the argument to the clausal complement, as in (13a); where α is a

quantifier phrase, α serves as the functor, and the clausal complement becomes the argument, as in (13b). (Read $[\![\alpha]\!]$ as "the semantic value of α.")

(13)
  (a) $\lambda x.\{\exists u[\text{says }(x, u)\ \&\ \text{samesays}(u, \text{that})\ \&\ \text{same-tokens}$
        $(u, \text{these})]\}.([\![\alpha]\!]).\ \beta$

  (b) $[\![\alpha]\!]\,(\lambda x.\{\exists u[\text{says }(x, u)\ \&\ \text{samesays}(u, \text{that})\ \&\ \text{same-tokens}$
        $(u, \text{these})]\}).\ \beta$

  (c) $[\![\text{every student}]\!](\lambda x.\{\exists u[\text{says }(x, u)\ \&\ \text{samesays}(u, \text{that})\ \&$
        $\text{same-tokens}(u, \text{these})]\}).$ She is cool.

Given this revised rule, sentence (10) gets cashed as (13c), in which the universal quantifier is correctly given wide scope.

But, even post-revision, there remains a problem for the paratactic account. Sentence (10) has a bound variable reading for 'she'—and this isn't captured by (13c), *because 'she', in that logical form, isn't in the scope of any quantifier.* 'She', not being bound, gets read as a free variable/indexical in (13c). So sentence (10) is predicted to have only the meaning that every student said that, e.g., *that girl there* is cool—'she' being said while demonstrating this particular girl. Clearly this is wrong: The salient reading of (10) has each student saying *of herself* that she is cool.

Consider now a different account of the semantics of speech reports, summarized in (14) below. Crucially, it uses the fact that 'that' in speech reports is a complementizer; and, respecting (8), it does not introduce a demonstrative into the logical form of such sentences. Lacking a name, let's introduce a perfectly arbitrary label: The Oxford-MIT Rule. (Note: There are many rules which would do the job here. The Oxford-MIT Rule is merely an illustration.)

(14) *The Oxford-MIT Rule:*
     If the syntactic structure of θ is of the form $[_{VP}[_V \text{says}]$
     $[_{CP}[_C \text{that}]\ [_S \ldots]]]$ then the logical form of θ is
     $\lambda x.\{(\exists y)\lambda z.[\text{similar}(z)([_S \ldots])](y)=1\ \&\ <x, y>\in[\![\text{says}]\!]$

The Oxford-MIT Rule, devised as it was with syntax in mind, can take advantage of the indices in the surface structure of sentence (10). That structure is given below:

(15)

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                    IP
                  /    \
              DP₁        VP
               |        /   \
        every student  V     CP
                       |     /  \
                      says  C    IP
                            |    /  \
                          that  NP   VP
                                |    |
                              she₁  is cool
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Taking this structure as input, the Oxford-MIT Rule (14) outputs the logical form (16a).

(16)
(a) $[\![$every student$_1]\!](\lambda x_2.\{(\exists y)\lambda z.[\text{similar}(z)([_S \text{ she}_1 \text{ is cool}])](y)=1$
$\quad \& <x_2,y> \in [\![\text{says}]\!])$
(b) $\forall x_1\{[\![\text{student}]\!](x_1) \supset \lambda x_2.\{(\exists y)[\lambda z.[\text{similar}(z)([_S \ x_1 \text{ is cool}])](y)=1$
$\quad \& <x_2,y> \in [\![\text{says}]\!]\}(x_1)\}$

In essence, because 'she$_1$' in the embedded clause 'she$_1$ is cool' is co-indexed with the subject quantifier phrase in (16a), 'she$_1$' gets treated as a variable, bound by the universal quantifier. Applying the rule for a universal quantifier phrase, this gives rise to (16b). Applying lambda conversion—where, of course, x_2 gets changed to x_1—gives the salient reading for (10):

(17) $\forall x_1\{[\![\text{student}]\!](x_1) \supset (\exists y)[\lambda z.[\text{similar}(z)([_S \ x_1 \text{ is cool}])](y)=1 \ \&$
$\quad <x_1,y> \in [\![\text{says}]\!]\}$

The Davidsonian account—basically that in (12)—does not respect (8), and the fact that 'that' in speech reports is a complementizer; it *does* put a demonstrative into the logical form, and it thereby puts the complement clause outside the scope of any quantifier in the matrix sentence—which yields the wrong result. As Higginbotham (1986) puts the general point:

... indications of inscriptions are sealed off from any interaction with linguistic elements in main clauses. (p. 39)

The Oxford-MIT Rule, on the other hand, respects syntax. Doing so, it allows quantifiers (and other elements) in the matrix to bind items in the complement clause.[7] I think it's obvious that the Oxford-MIT Rule does better in this respect.

Could the neo-Davidsonian develop a compositional mechanism which handled this sort of sentence, while maintaining that there is a demonstrative in the logical form? I suppose so. Would the resulting compositional mechanism be as elegant and simple as that in (14)? I greatly doubt it. Ultimately, both accounts must provide a mapping from syntactic structure to the logical form each proposes for speech reports; but, and this is the crux of the matter, something like the Oxford-MIT Rule is likely to be simpler, more elegant and just plain better because it respects syntax. Syntactic structures are, after all, the *inputs* to semantic rules. So, semantic rules which profit from syntactic insights can't help but fare better. Generally speaking, anyway. That is why (8) is a sound inductive principle.

Another illustration of my contention that, in the case at hand, respecting syntax simplifies the semantics of speech reports. Some of our speech is declarative. But some of it isn't. And, when we speak in other moods, our speech can be reported; it can even be reported using mixed quotation. For instance, suppose Alice utters (18):

(18) Where did my brother buy all that beer?

Given that Alice's brother is John, I can truthfully report that:

(19) Alice asked where John "bought all that beer."

An account of mixed quotation must assign a meaning to (19); but neither the rough-and-ready rule in (3), nor the quantifier-friendly version in (12) will do the job. (For simplicity's sake, I'll discuss the former rule in what follows.) First, some obvious reasons: Sentence (19) doesn't contain the word 'says'; nor is the grammatical object of the speech-reporting verb of the form $[_{CP}$ that $[_S \beta]]$. Hence, strictly speaking, (3) does not apply. But this is easily taken care of: Just substitute 'speech-reporting verb' for 'says' in (3), and allow the grammatical object to be anything of the following form (taking γ to be a meta-linguistic variable over syntactic complementizers).

(20) $[_{CP} [_C \gamma] [_S \beta]]$

This yields the following generalized version of (3), where ψ is a speech reporting verb:

(21) *Generalized Cappelen-Lepore Interpretive Rule for Speech Reports:*

If the grammatical object of $\ulcorner \alpha\ \psi s \urcorner$ is both of the form $[_{CP}\ [_C\ \gamma$ $[_S\ \beta]]$ and of the form $[_{NP}\ "\beta"]$ then generate the logical form $\ulcorner \exists u[\psi s\ (\alpha, u)\ \&\ \text{samesays}(u,\ that)\ \&\ \text{same-tokens}(u,\ these)].\ \beta \urcorner$.

This generalized version of (3) now applies to the syntactic structure of (19), 'Alice asked where John "bought all that beer"'.

So much for obvious, and easily solved, difficulties with (3). Here's the harder case: What logical form does (21), the generalized version of (3), assign to (19)? If 'where' is treated as the syntactic complementizer in the surface structure—i.e., as $[_C\ \gamma]$—then the predicted logical form is (22a); if, on the contrary, 'where' is treated as part of the embedded sentence—i.e., as part of $[_S\ \beta]$—then the predicted logical form is (22b).

(22)
(a) $\exists u[\text{asks}\ (\text{Alice}, u)\ \&\ \text{samesays}(u,\ that)\ \&\ \text{same-tokens}(u,\ these)].$ John bought all that beer

(b) $\exists u[\text{asks}\ (\text{Alice}, u)\ \&\ \text{samesays}(u,\ that)\ \&\ \text{same-tokens}(u,\ these)].$ where John bought all that beer

Now, I'm not sure whether either of (22a–b) are well formed. But, even if they are, neither gives the right truth conditions for (19). Alice didn't ask *whether* John bought all that beer; she asked a where-question. Yet a whether-question would seem to be the only possible reading of (22a). As for (22b), it incorrectly says that Alice's utterance of 'Where did my brother buy all that beer?' samesays the *indirect question* 'where John bought all that beer'; but indirect questions and direct questions, though semantically related, are not samesayers: In the case at hand, the direct question denotes something propositional, while the indirect question denotes a location! Finally, of course, Alice didn't same-token 'bought all that beer'; she same-tokened 'buy all that beer'.

One can react to this data about interrogative speech reports in two different ways. It certainly shows that Cappelen and Lepore's account is insufficiently general; so one could respond by trying to broaden the theory, while still refusing to respect syntax. I gather this is how the authors themselves will respond. I, on the other hand, take it as a sign that an account of speech reports which respects syntax is likely to be preferable. I won't burden you with such an account, but will simply note that the seeds of an account can be found in Higginbotham's (1993) recent work.

Okay then: The Interface Rule in (8), to prefer, *ceteris paribus,* a hypothesis about logical form which respects syntax, is reasonable (though defeasible); and, it appears to apply to the case at hand. Next point: The 'that' of 'says that' is not a demonstrative in the surface syntax of speech reports. This lends support to—though it does not entail—the conclusion that there is no demonstrative corresponding to 'that' in the logical form of speech reports. Hence Cappelen and Lepore's account is likely incorrect.[8]

Demonstrating "Rogue Utterances"

Here's a more direct argument: Whether or not there's a demonstrative in the surface structure of speech reports, positing a demonstrative in their logical form makes the wrong predictions about how speech reports get interpreted. Cappelen and Lepore cite with approval Davidson's (1979: 91) dictum that, "the device of pointing can be used on whatever is in range of the pointer . . ." I agree with the slogan. But I think it makes trouble for Davidson's paratactic account—and hence for Cappelen and Lepore. Notice: On Davidson's account, (23) is a perfect paraphrase of (5a):

(5a) Alice said that Dole is a goof
(23) Alice said that. Dole is a goof.

Now suppose I write on the board, 'Dole is a great patriot'. And suppose I say (23) while pointing to what is written on the board. I take it that, given these circumstances, I could assert that Alice said that Dole is a great patriot—following up my assertion by adding that, in my own opinion, Dole is a goof. Now compare an utterance of (5a), said while pointing at 'Dole is a great patriot'. Point how I may, in uttering (5a) I cannot report Alice as having said that Dole is a great patriot. There is, then, a striking contrast between (5a) and (23). What does the contrast amount to? The logical form of sentence (23) really does contain a demonstrative, and said demonstrative can be used to point to anything in the environment; the logical form of (5a), on the other hand, does not contain a demonstrative.[9]

This difficulty carries over to Cappelen and Lepore's account. According to them, sentence (1a) has the logical form (1b).

(1a) Alice said that life "is difficult to understand"
(1b) $\exists u$[says (Alice, u) & samesays(u, that) & same-tokens(u, these)]. Life is difficult to understand

If that's right, one ought to be able to say (1a), point at a token of 'Dole is a great patriot', and thereby claim that some utterance of Alice's samesays

'Dole is a great patriot' and same-tokens 'is a great patriot'! In these circumstances an utterance of (1a) would mean, in effect:

(24) Alice said that Dole "is a great patriot." Life is difficult to
        understand

Obviously, no matter what is pointed at, (1a) cannot be used to say this.

In sum, because Cappelen and Lepore follow Davidson in positing a demonstrative in the logical form of mixed quotations, they inherit two problems: First, their theory does not respect syntax, which, given Interface Rule (8) is a bad thing; second, their theory makes incorrect predictions about how mixed quotation sentences can be used.

3. A Positive Alternative?

By now you'll be thinking: "Yes, there are difficulties with Cappelen and Lepore's account of mixed quotation. But at least they *have* an account." Fair enough, I owe a positive alternative. Here it is:

(25) *Rob's Mixed Quotation Rule:*
        Given a case of mixed quotation in a sentence θ, remove the
        relevant quotation marks. If the resulting syntactic struc-
        ture of θ is of the form $[_{VP}[_V \text{ says}][_{CP}[_C \text{ that}] [_S...]]]$ then
        the logical form of this VP is $\lambda x.\{(\exists y)\lambda z.$
        $[\text{similar}(z)([_S ...])](y)=1 \ \& \ <x,y> \in [\![\text{says}]\!].$

Two observations about what (25) says, before I lay out some of its virtues. Its first clause turns mixed quotations into indirect quotations; and its second clause is just the Oxford-MIT Rule. In which case, (25) essentially treats mixed quotation as a variety of indirect quotation. Now for its merits.

One thing that (25) has going for it is this: According to Cappelen and Lepore, mixed quotation blends the devices of direct and indirect quotation. If that were right, there could be no mixed quotation device which was not also a direct quotation device. Now, is it really so obvious that there *couldn't* be a language which (a) had the translation of 'say' taking clausal complements; (b) never has 'say' taking nominal complements—and yet (c) exhibited mixed quotation? It would certainly *seem* possible. And this would precisely be a language which had indirect and mixed quotation, but no direct quotation. Travel to China might, I'm told, uncover such a language. But there are telling examples nearer to home. English has verbs which can only be used in indirect speech reports; and yet they (marginally?) allow *mixed* quotation with such verbs—even though direct quota-

tion is not an option. Sentence (26a) is reasonably well formed, for example; while (26b) is completely out.

(26)
  (a) Mary intimated that life "is difficult to understand"
  (b) *Mary intimated, "life is difficult to understand"

English has lots of verbs like this: 'communicate', 'assert', 'convey', 'suggest', 'state', 'deny', etc. In each case, mixed quotation using these verbs, if a bit awkward, is reasonably good; while direct quotation is grammatically quite bad.

Similarly, there are *constructions* for indirect quotation which do not accommodate direct quotation: e.g., $\ulcorner\alpha\ \phi\text{-ed}\ \beta\ \text{to}\ \theta\urcorner$. Yet these constructions permit mixed quotation. A case in point: (27a-b) are both fine; but which "device for direct quotation" combines with (27a) here, to yield (27b)?

(27)
  (a) Jim pleaded with the firefighter to save his dog
  (b) Jim pleaded with the firefighter to save "his precious doggy"

In contrast with Cappelen and Lepore's account, a rule like (25) allows for mixed quotation even where direct quotation would be awkward. That's a virtue.

Next virtue of (25). Cappelen and Lepore argue that mixed quotation poses a problem for what I will call "traditional propositional theories" of indirect quotation: theories which require the reported speaker to stand in the saying relation to the proposition expressed by the complement clause. Here is the problem: Assume $\ulcorner\alpha$ says $[_{CP}$ that $\theta]\urcorner$ entails $\ulcorner$says$(\llbracket\theta\rrbracket)(\alpha)\urcorner$. This assumption, an immediate consequence of traditional propositional theories, leads to one of two equally unhappy options, whenever θ contains mixed quotation—or so Cappelen and Lepore argue. If one supposes that $\llbracket\theta\rrbracket$ is nonsensical when θ contains mixed quotation, $\ulcorner\alpha$ says $[_{CP}$ that $\theta]\urcorner$ is falsely predicted to be nonsensical as well; if, on the other hand, one supposes that $\llbracket\theta\rrbracket$ has a coherent sense, it would seem that $\llbracket\theta\rrbracket$ would have to be about words—precisely because θ is (mixed) quotational. But then $\ulcorner\alpha$ says $[_{CP}$ that $\theta]\urcorner$ is wrongly predicted to relate α to a meta-linguistic proposition.

An example may make Cappelen and Lepore's objection to traditional propositional theories clearer. Take (1a), and suppose that $\llbracket$'Life "is difficult to understand"'$\rrbracket$ is nonsensical—because the sentence 'Life "is difficult to understand"' contains mixed quotation. On this assumption, there is no proposition to which Alice is related by (1a), since there is no proposition expressed by 'Life "is difficult to understand"'. Hence the entire sentence (1a) is falsely predicted to be nonsensical. Now the other horn of the

dilemma. Suppose that ⟦'Life "is difficult to understand"'⟧ is a coherent proposition. What could it be about? It would seem that ⟦'Life "is difficult to understand"'⟧ would have to be a proposition about words—precisely because 'Life "is difficult to understand"' is (mixed) quotational. So, on this assumption, what (1a) expresses is a relationship between Alice *and a proposition about words*. But this just isn't right: In so far as (1a) relates Alice to any proposition, it relates her to a proposition about life, to the effect that life is difficult to understand. And this isn't a proposition about words.

Cappelen and Lepore take these false predictions to spell doom for any semantics that has speech reports relate the reported speaker to the proposition expressed by the complement clause. But I think the problem lies elsewhere. One gets into trouble by supposing that the complement clause *contains quotation marks* at the point of interpretation: This makes it appear that either there is no proposition expressed by the complement clause, or the proposition expressed is meta-linguistic. But, applying the rule in (25), this "problem" vanishes: The quotation marks are "erased" before the proposition expressed by the complement clause is determined. This allows there to be a perfectly coherent proposition, not about words, to which the reported speaker can be related: It's the proposition expressed by θ, absent the mixed-quotational marks.

So much for the virtues of my alternative. Now some worries. You may have noticed that the rule in (25) implements an essentially deflationary approach to mixed quotation—one which Cappelen and Lepore explicitly reject:

> ... where quotes appear in the complement clause of an indirect report, remove the contribution of the quotes to the content expressed, and the resulting content must be identical to that of ... the reported sentence (1997).[10]

The problem with the deflationary strategy is supposed to be that "it ignores the contribution quotes make in mixed cases." In particular, "the content expressed by the complement clause of a mixed case is about words"—and the deflationary strategy disregards this. (To clarify: Cappelen and Lepore argue that *the complement clause* isn't about words, as you just saw. But they maintain that *the matrix sentence*—the speech report, not the speech reported—is about words.) How, then, do I propose to defend (25)?

Here's my "defense": The deflationary strategy, as implemented in (25), does not "ignore" or "disregard" the fact that mixed quotations are (in part) about words, because mixed quotations *aren't* about words. It's just not true that mixed quotations say something both about the content *and* about the form of the reported utterance: Nothing about words/form is

said. And, contrary to what Cappelen and Lepore (1997: 443) claim, no words/forms are *referred to* by the speaker. Returning to the original example: In uttering (1a) the speaker *asserts* nothing whatever about the words employed; he doesn't talk about words at all. What the speaker *asserts* is precisely what (25) predicts: that Alice said something similar to $[_S$ Life is difficult to understand]; in which case, rule (25) does not "ignore" the fact that (1a) is (in part) about words/form—because (1a) isn't about words/form. It's only "about" content.

That being said, it's obvious that a use of (1a) would be very misleading, and hence very infelicitous, in a situation where Alice *didn't* actually speak the words 'is difficult to understand'. This fact clouds intuitions about truth conditions: One is, for example, tempted to say that (1a) is *false* where Alice really uttered 'Life is tough to understand'. But this is a mistake, in my view. Here's a useful comparison, to highlight the nature of the error. Imagine Betty utters 'Alice said that life is difficult to understand', pronouncing 'is difficult to understand' in a drunken tone. Betty would assert only (28)—precisely what rule (25) predicts.

(28) $\lambda x.\{(\exists y)\lambda z.[\text{similar}(z)([_S \text{ Life is difficult to understand}])](y)=1$
        $\& \ <x,y>\in [\![\text{says}]\!](\text{Alice})$

And yet, at the same time, Betty would "show" (as one used to say) that Alice slurred the words 'is difficult to understand'—where the "showing" is so blatant that Betty's report would be fabulously out of line if Alice was not inebriated, and didn't sound it. Still, out of line or not, I don't think Betty would speak falsely—as long as Alice did, in fact, assert that life is difficult to understand.

If I'm right, mixed quotes aren't about words. So, how do they work their special magic? In a word, mimicry. Seen from this perspective, mixed quotation marks are—to borrow an idea from Corey Washington (1992)—punctuation marks: Putting these marks in allows the writer to highlight the echoic nature of the utterance; but, despite Cappelen and Lepore's repeated insistence to the contrary, a statement about words/form is no part of what the mixed-quote-user says. That is precisely why rule (25) does not err in erasing the quotes before computing the truth conditions of the mixed quotation speech report. Again: In mixed quotation, one "shows" the linguistic tools which were used by the reported speaker; and those "watching the show" acquire beliefs about the form of speech employed. But, to paraphrase Davidson's (1978: 261) thoughts on metaphor, it's an error to fasten on the contents of the thoughts a mixed quotation provokes, and to read these contents into the mixed quotation itself.

Other parallels are legion: A speaker could report parts of Alice's conversation in a squeaky voice, or with a French accent, or with a stutter, or

using great volume. In none of these cases would the speech reporter say, assert, or state that Alice spoke in these various ways. Speaking thus, the audience will naturally take the speech reporter to be imitating Alice—why else speak in these peculiar ways? And, if the reporter wasn't accurately parroting Alice, the audience may rightly censure him. But this by no means establishes that anything false was *said* about Alice's voice, accent, tone, etc.: In these cases, the truth conditions of the speech report are exhausted by the meaning of the words, and how the words are put together; as far as truth conditions are concerned, the tone, volume, accent etc. add nothing whatever. Ditto, say I, for the quotation marks in mixed quotation. In which case (1a) isn't *false* where Alice actually speaks the words, 'is tough to understand'. It may, of course, be infelicitous and misleading. In spades. But this doesn't distinguish it from the infelicitous and misleading use of a drunken tone, when reporting the speech of a teetotaler. Given this, no special semantic rule is required to capture "the extra" truth conditions, the statement "about words," encoded in mixed quotations. There is none.[11]

The foregoing closely connects with another possible worry about (25). Cappelen and Lepore argue that a theory of quotation must satisfy four constraints:

(29) *Cappelen and Lepore's Constraints*
   C1: Mixed and indirect quotation should receive overlapping semantic treatments.
   C2: Direct and mixed quotation should receive overlapping semantic reatments.
   C3: Direct and indirect quotation should receive distinct semantic treatments.
   C4: Quotation in pure, direct, and mixed quotation should receive overlapping semantic treatments.

Now, rule (25) easily satisfies C1: If I'm right, mixed quotation is a *variety* of indirect quotation. And C3 poses no special problem either, since nothing in (25) conflicts with the idea that indirect quotation conveys the *content* of the reported speech, whereas direct quotation notes the *form*. It might seem that my account cannot satisfy C2; but, in fact, mixed quotation may *show* what direct quotation must *say*—so there is an overlap. The real problem is C4.

What pure and direct quotation have in common is that both are "about" form. And, if I'm right, this isn't true of mixed quotation: As far as truth conditions are concerned, mixed quotation is indirect quotation—hence mixed quotation *says* nothing about form. Therefore, in contrast with direct quotation, mixed quotation (as I see it, anyway) is not at all like pure quotation. Which violates C4.

Here I bite the bullet: My account, encapsulated in (25), fails with respect to C4. Happily, C4 may not be a valid constraint on theories of quotation. The principle argument which Cappelen and Lepore adduce in favour of C4 goes as follows: The arguments in (30) are valid; if C4 were false, these arguments would not be valid; therefore, C4 is true.

(30)
  (a) Alice said, "Life is difficult to understand." Therefore, a token of 'Life is difficult to understand' was uttered. [This inference indicates that direct and pure quotation are linked.]
  (b) Alice said that life "is difficult to understand." Therefore, a token of 'is difficult to understand' was uttered. [This inference indicates that mixed and pure quotation are linked.]

The problem with Cappelen and Lepore's argument for C4 is its first premise: (30b) is *not* a valid inference. As I said above, where a token of 'is difficult to understand' was *not* uttered, a use of 'Alice said that life "is difficult to understand"' would be extremely misleadingly and thoroughly unhappy. But it wouldn't be strictly speaking false—assuming Alice said something sufficiently similar to 'life is difficult to understand'. Just like the use of a drunken tone in indirect quotation doesn't automatically renders the report false, if the reported speaker was cold sober. Hence the premise of (30b) may be true while its conclusion is false. Given the *invalidity* of (30b), one cannot safely argue from its *validity* to the truth of C4! And, lacking a solid argument for C4, the latter cannot be used to discredit rule (25).[12]

Let me sum up. I noted two problems with Cappelen and Lepore's suggested account of mixed quotation. Both derive immediately from positing a demonstrative, corresponding to the 'that' of 'says that', in the logical form of these speech reports: First, inserting a demonstrative in logical form conflicts with the Interface Rule (8)—given the fact that there is not, in general, a demonstrative in the surface structure; second, positing a demonstrative in logical form leads to the (incorrect) prediction that "the demonstrative" can be used to pick out rogue utterances in the context.

Having noted these problems with Cappelen and Lepore's theory, I suggested a positive alternative: that mixed quotation is equivalent to indirect quotation—give or take some mimicry. If that's right, Cappelen and Lepore are likely mistaken when they claim that "the influential views on the semantics of indirect quotation cannot accommodate mixed quotation . . ." (p. 4). All these "influential views" require, to cover mixed quotation, is a story about verbal imitation consistent with their treatment of indirect speech.

Notes

2. As will emerge, that the whole sentence 'life is difficult to understand' is the nominal object of 'says' does *not* lead to the false prediction that Alice employed the word 'life'.

3. For those unfamiliar with the notation: $[_{CP} \ldots]$ denotes a Complementizer Phrase, a phrase marker composed of a complementizer $[_C \ldots]$ (e.g., 'whether' and 'if' in indirect questions, 'for,' 'that,' etc.) and a sentential complement, $[_S \ldots]$. *That*-clauses are paradigmatic Complementizer Phrases.

4. You might wonder why the third clause is required at all: Why can't *both* (3a) and (3b) apply, thus generating the desired logical form? The reason is: Sentence (1a)—and the logical form which Cappelen and Lepore give for it, namely (1b)—entail that there's a *single* utterance of Alice's which stands in *both* the samesaying *and* the same-tokening relation to 'Life is difficult to understand'. But (i), the result of applying both (3a) and (3b), has no such entailment.

> (i) $\exists u[\text{says (Alice, } u) \ \& \ \text{samesays}(u, \text{ that})]$. Life is difficult to understand & $\exists u[\text{same-tokens}(u, \text{ these})]$. Life is difficult to understand

To see this, notice that (i) is true where Alice says (iia) and (iib), but nothing else.

> (ii)
> (a)   Life is tough to fathom
> (b)   Death is difficult to understand

Alice's saying (iia) makes the first conjunct of (i) true: She samesays 'life is difficult to understand', though she employed other words. Her saying (iib) makes the second conjunct of (i) true—where 'these' indicates just the Verb Phrase 'is difficult to understand'—because Alice thereby same-tokens 'is difficult to understand'.

5. Minor complication: The third clause, as its stands, won't quite work. Only 'is difficult to understand' is quoted in (1a), and (3c) copies *precisely the quoted material:* It takes $[_{NP} \text{``}\beta\text{''}]$ in surface structure and places β (as demonstratum) in the logical form. But what one wants "at the end of the logical form," so to speak, is the whole sentence 'life is difficult to understand', not just the quoted material 'is difficult to understand'. So the Interpretive Rule must be revised to allow the quotes to appear *within* β, or within parts of β, even while all of β is copied into the logical form. I leave this as an exercise.

6. One might put the point as: Do speech reports wear their logical form on their sleeve? Or again: Should speech reports be treated homophonically? Answering 'Yes' to these questions, I reject Davidson's paratactic treatment.

7. Though Higginbotham doesn't say so, very similar problems arise with (i) and (ii)—which clearly are not equivalent to (iii) and (iv) respectively:

(i)   Everybody who owns one says that their Saturn is reliable
(ii) Maria doesn't eat liver, but she says that Olga does
(iii) Everybody who owns one says that. Their Saturn is reliable
(iv) Maria doesn't eat liver, but she says that. Olga does.

8. I can just hear some hard core Davidsonians insisting: "But still, there could be a demonstrative in logical form anyway!" This is true, of course. But then again, it *could* be the case that every belief reporting sentence has the name 'Jehovah' in its logical form. The thing is, the syntax strongly suggests—does not prove, establish, or demonstrate, but suggests—otherwise.

9. One might say, with Lepore and Loewer (1990: 98): "It is a convention that [the referent of 'that'] is the portion of *u* following the occurrence of 'that'." But where does this convention come from, and why doesn't it apply to (23)? Worse, why should it be *impossible* to break the convention—a state of affairs the Davidson of "Communication and Convention" (1982) would never envisage—if the expression in question really is a demonstrative?

10. As they note, this approach presupposes "a systematic way for distinguishing mixed quotation from indirect quotation harbouring pure quotation." Lacking that, the sentence (i) would have its quotes erased—yielding incorrect results.

(i)   Alice said that "life is difficult to understand" is a sentence

I agree that this is presupposed. I don't agree that it's a problem.

11. Someone might say: Surely there's a difference between indirect-quotation-plus-a-drunken-tone on the one hand, and mixed quotation on the other—namely the explicit use of quotation marks; the quotation marks strongly suggests that direct quotation is in play. To which I might reply: Quotation marks are artificial; belonging, in the first instance, to the written form of a small sub-class of languages. One should not, then, pay too close attention to them when doing the semantics of *natural languages*.

12. As far as I can see, rule (25) also allows Cappelen and Lepore's sentence (11), from p. 436, to sometimes come out true:

(11) Nicola said that Alice is a "phil*t*osopher"

Here's the general idea. Assume Nicola stands in the says-relation to the proposition that Alice is a philosopher. This seems plausible: Surely Nicola could truly be reported as having said that. Assume further that the proposition ALICE IS A PHILOSOPHER is relevantly similar to the illformed, though interpretable, sentence 'Alice is a philtosopher'. (Whatever the independent merits of assuming similarity to ill-formed linguistic entities, Cappelen and Lepore really cannot object to it: In order to make their own view accommodate (11), they insist that it is simply part of the basic data that an utterance that doesn't express anything in English can samesay [another person's] utterances.) Given these two assumptions, there will be something similar to the complement clause of (11), to which Nicola stands in the says-relation. So, by rule (25), (11) comes out true. What then distinguishes (11) from the sentence 'Nicola said that Alice is a philosopher'? Mimicry. Again.

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